Introduction

The Maginot Line, scapegoat

Here we present an overall picture to you of the strategy employed by German (Yellow Plan Fall Gelb) and by French (Plane Dyle) during the first days of the German attack of May 10, 1940.

The goal of this document is to show that the French defeat, almost played in a few days, is without relationship with the supposed weaknesses of the Maginot Line.

It will then be noted, undoubtedly, that the Maginot Line suffered more from the flame attacks and the posterior French denigrations to the armistice that German military attacks of 1940.

It should be said that the French defeat, by its speed, has amazed the international public opinion. And, whereas the latter claimed a scapegoat, one gave of them him several of which, inter alia, the Maginot Line and, to a lesser extent, Luxemburgish (to which we devote another file).

Yellow plan

The Yellow Plan (Fall Gelb) is the German code name which indicates the whole of the device to be implemented to attack France (after Poland). This plan, elaborate since 1939 by the Manstein general, underwent many rehandlings until its application on May 10, 1940.

Three groups of German armies make at the same time movement in neutral territories.

To north, the group B, passes the borders of the Netherlands and Belgium.

At the east, the group C puts in protection flanking, vis-a-vis the Maginot Line (but out of reach its guns).

In the center, the group has (most important by its armor-plated divisions), enters to Belgium and to Luxembourg and crosses the Ardennes (green circle) to lead to Sedan and to take with reverse the French Armies which skirt the Franco-Belgian border.

This plan is all the more dared that the troops can easily be stopped on the narrow roads of Luxembourg north and their passage of the Ardennes east far from being obvious. Moreover French does not await at all German on the side of Sedan because, according to their general-in-chief (Gamelin), the German armies can pass neither through the Maginot Line (to the east of Sedan), nor through the forest of the Ardennes (in the North-East of Sedan). Blow French neglected the defense of this city, with the profit of the remainder of the Belgian border where they massed their most modern armies.

For the Manstein general, the French weak link is thus Sedan. And as it is not question of attacking the Line Maginot, the general proposes to make cross the north of Luxembourg, then the Ardennes, by a mass of armoured tanks leading quickly to Sedan.

Certain German general officers would prefer to reiterate the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, plan which had failed to succeed at the time (it is besides that of which is persuaded the Gamelin general who rejoue beginnings of the Great War with leisure). But would be then to run up against the fine flower of the French Army, with all the risks of a frontal battle. Hitler slices and chooses the Manstein plan.

The historians are very divided as for the initial author of this plan (Hitler, Général Manstein, Général Brauchitsch). On this subject one will be able to read with interest the book/thesis of the Koeltz General - how our destiny Editions Hatchet 1957 was played.

Erich von Manstein (1887-1973)

Civil statue

Born in Berlin in 1887, Manstein is the son of Erich von Lewinski (general of artillery) and of Helene von Sperling. Orphan, it is adopted by his uncle Lieutenant Général Georg von Manstein. He dies in München in 1973.

Career

As the documents on Manstein are legion (and due) we will restrict ourselves to make a fast review on its career which, considering the Prussian spirit of the time, could only be a soldier.

After having spent 6 years in the body of the juniors he enlists in the 3rd guards with foot, then in 1913 he entered to the military academy and is promoted lieutenant at the beginning of the Great War.

Briefly with the face, in 1915 it is promoted captain, staff officer until 1919.

Between the two world wars it climbs the hierarchical levels in various staffs. Become major-general and assistant manager of the general staff of ground, it supervises the plan of rearmament of 1935.

It begins the second world war in Poland, always in a staff. Then he proposes his daring plan of invasion of France but does not take part in it when this last is implemented.

France, Russia, the Crimea, Manstein are on many faces. In 1942 it is promoted marshal and, at the beginning of 1944, it is put at the retirement.

In 1945 it settles in the west of Germany and, after the armistice, shown war crimes it is condemned to 18 years of prison. For medical reasons it is released in 1953. In 1955 it publishes its memories of war, (Verlorene Siege) then becomes adviser for the new army of the West Germany.

1914. Schlieffen plan

In 1914 the German army attacks France while passing by the plains of Belgium (Schlieffen plan), on the left of the Ardennes (main forest not easily passable by an important army). And it is only one coarse error of command which makes him lose the enormous advantage that it had taken on the French troops.

As the same error repeats twice with difficulty continuation, in 1940 the integral application of a new Schlieffen plan, possibly improved, can be very dangerous for France. Also the Gamelin general it envisaged a parade: its Dyle Plan.

Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913)

Civil statue

In Berlin, the count Alfred von Schlieffen is the son of a Prussian general commander. He dies in Berlin in 1913.

Career

After studies of right it enters the army in 1854 and becomes officer of cavalry. Transferred to the staff, it takes part in 1866 in the war against Austria.

After military attach3e to Paris it makes the countryside against France (1870-1871) with the staff of the large-duke of Mecklembourg. In 1888, it is promoted Master of higher district and is thus representing of the chief of staff the count von Waldersee whom it succeeds in 1891. In 1903 he is general, member of the Superior council of the war.

It is in 1905 qu ' it presents its plan of offensive strategy against France, with a pincer movement left the North-East Belgium and a fast projection towards the west, plan which it proposes to make follow by an attack of Russia.

In 1906 it takes its retirement and is named marshal in 1911.

In 1914 its plan is applied successfully until its successors make some errors of tactic exploited by French.

The Dyle plan

The situation

France (as any other country) cannot align its various armies under only one local command. And the hinge between two armies is inevitably a weak point (two commands which are likely badly to coordinate their movements). The town of Sedan, protected by the Ardennes (that Gamelin regards as insuperable), is a priori an ideal place to be used as hinge between two armies.

In 1939, it is the device which adopts the Gamelin general, commander-in-chief of the French troops and the British task force. Sedan is thus hinge between the 9th army (western) and the 2nd army (is of Sedan).

The Dyle plan

Thanks to the Maginot Line and in the Ardennes, Germany has only little choice to attack France, it must pass by Belgium by reiterating its Schlieffen plan of 1914.

The Dyle plan is elaborate on this assumption, by the Gamelin General. It consists, at the beginning of the German attack, to penetrate in Belgium and Holland to take out of clipper the troops moving.

From the tactical point of view one can consider this plan as doubtful because the French troops should be much more powerful while operating on a ground than they prepare since years (border) that while sinking with discovered out of ground foreign which can be badly co-operative, even hostile!

From the strategic point of view one can consider this plan as good because France cannot let German be spread out in Belgium and reinforce with leisure their device. To counter whereas they are moving (and thus very vulnerable) is more than conceivable; condition has however that the Belgians are of agreement so that the belligerents fight on their ground and that German reiterates indeed their plan of attack of 1914!

Moreover, from the moral point of view of the public opinion (French of course) a battle on the Belgian ground is preferable with a conflict on the national territory.

Maurice Gustave Gamelin (1872-1958)

Civil statue

Born in Paris, he is the son of an general inspector of the Armies. He dies in Paris in 1958.

Career

Raise officer with Saint-Cyr military school it leaves major in 1893 and begins there his career in North Africa. Returned in metropolis in 1897, it integrates the School of War where it is noticed by the lieutenant-colonel Foch (future marshal).

In 1906, it publishes a “philosophical Study on the Art of the War”, which places it among the best military thinkers of its time.

In 1914 it is with the staff of the Joffre general whom it has followed for a few years. Its effectiveness, inter alia at the time of the battle of the Marne is worth to him to become lieutenant-colonel, to take a command and to fight in Alsace, then in the Sum.

It becomes general colonel then in 1916.

Between the two world wars its rise is such as in 1939 it reached the top of the military hierarchy and is généralissime armed French forces.

Then, its multiple errors of appreciation of the involved forces, the possibilities of operation of the modern armies, its Dyle plan conceived on assumptions badly tested, etc allied with the disease, lead France towards one of its most memorable defeats.

Decree on September 6, 1940, it is accused, at the sides of Leon Blum, Edouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud. Then the lawsuit is deferred and Gamelin is off-set in Germany from where it will be released only in 1945.

It then published its memories under the title “To be useful”, memories which, according to the specialists are only one long attempt at self-justification.

Fall Gelb against Dyle Plan

To the beginning of the German offensive of May 10, 1940 the Dyle plan is applied to the letter and until May 13 does not undergo any modification, date on which the French high command realizes finally which German is not republishing the Schlieffen plan but that they pass in force by the Ardennes, lead to Sedan very badly defended and that they are thus likely to open the possibility of isolating the advanced Franco-British armies in Belgium.

It is thus noted that German:

- make diversion in Belgium and Holland (armed B), attracting thus most powerful of the Franco-British troops

- bore towards Sedan (by the Ardennes via Luxembourg and Belgium) with the large one of armor-plated divisions (armed A)

- with reverse the committed allied armies in Belgium take.

This plan of mowing against armies which are themselves carrying out a catch tortures some makes think of part of play of Go which one could describe as “beautiful” if one were not here in reality.

The yellow plan is extremely risky because, if general Gamelin follows not his obsession (the insuperable Ardennes and plane Schlieffen which should be reiterated), the allied armies easily have the possibility of blocking German armor-plated divisions which thread on the narrow and often boxed roads of Luxembourg.

German prevents the attacks of side (left the troops stationed on the level of the Maginot Line), by insinuating some troops (primarily of the infantry) to the south of Luxembourg. But it is only one illusory protection in the event of air raid of the armor-plated columns. Also their only real protections are discretion, the speed of crossing of the Ardennes and the obstinacy of the Gamelin general.

The History shows that they have, seems it, profited from these three protections.

At all events, we hope to have shown that the Maginot Line does not have of anything failed in this set of movements, disastrous play to the French Armies.

Reactions

A few days after the publication of our document, certain Net surfers stated to us that they had not changed an opinion and always believed that the war had been lost because of the Maginot Line. Example:

I think that the Maginot Line is nevertheless responsible for our defeat, although I would be also the first to defend his utility. A.C.

In our documents we evoke facts. Then, and they is happy, each one to forge its opinion.