General Ernest Courtot de Cissey. He is Minister for the war during the creation of the CSG (Superior council of the War) on July 27, 1872. He seems not to have left the memory of an irreproachable man, but it is another problem…

The CSG (Superior council of the War)

The CSG is the organization which, since its creation (just after the defeat of 1870) chapeaute all the French military hierarchy. It is placed under the presidency of the Minister for the war and is composed of the major generals inspectors of army and of the Head of the State general major.

The CSG is obligatorily consulted for each project concerning the army. He is thus quite naturally consulted, on May 22, 1922, when the question arises of defining a new strategy of defense. The subject is so extreme that the President of the Republic (Millerand) there sits in person.

The first put question is significant:

Does the Council consider it convenient to undertake as of the time of peace of the defensive organizations in order to ensure the inviolability of the national territory?

Prophetic DEBATEs

Without going already into the details, let us say that the verbal exchanges, during this meeting, clearly clarify the divergent points of view of some of the participants.

The put question raises two debates: one on the inviolability of the territory and the other, more implicit, on the type of fortification to be considered. The divergences of the ideas which appear then during the meeting are the balls which the French Army and the Maginot Line will trail, particularly of 1935 to 1940.

It is what makes extremely interesting this CSG of May 22, 1922.

Participants in the CSG of 22-5-1922

On May 22, 1922, the President of the Republic, Alexandre Millerand, chairs the meeting of the Superior council of the War. The Minister for the War, André Maginot, who has just been named at this station on January 15, is the official president of the CSG but it is the Marshal Pétain, vice-president of this Council since 1920, which animates of them the debates in the presence of the Marshals Foch and Joffre, as well as Generals Berthelot, Buat, Debeney, Guillaumat and Hellot.

President of the Republic Alexandre Millerand

Minister for the War Andre Maginot

Marshal Ferdinand Foch

Marshal Joseph Joffre

Marshal Philippe Pétain

General Henri Berthelot

General Edmond Buat

General Eugene Debeney

General Louis Guillaumat

General Frederic Hellot

The capital object of the meeting rests on this question:

Paramount question

Inviolability of the national territory

Does the Council consider it convenient to undertake as of the time of peace of the defensive organizations in order to ensure the inviolability of the national territory?

Inviolability? Before 1914, and since centuries, the warlike doctrines selected are relatively simple and constant: in times of peace the Armies prepare with the war. In the event of attack they go on the battle field (with weapons and luggage), are defended, against attack…, and the best gains. The localization of the engagements, although desirable apart from the national territory, has however only little importance, the whole is to gain the victory.

However, during the war which has just finished, one noted (bitterly in the industrialized north of France) that the modern conflict is not any more one simple quarrel between armies, that it can last and thus mobilize all the lifeblood of the belligerents, soldiers and industrial. Like these forces, especially those industrial sensitive, are established on sites geologically located at the borders north and the North-East of France, it is thus appropriate from now on to prevent that a battle field does not crystallize in the vicinity of these areas. And the Pétain Marshal reveals his thought:

All Council is undoubtedly of agreement on this point and there is not the question. That which installation is to know if, to ensure this inviolability, one must only count on the Armies, the possibility for those of being always in measurement, on the basis of all the points of the border, of carrying the war at the enemy or if it is necessary, in any event and as insurance, to undertake as of the time of peace of the defensive organizations allowing the Armies to fight with advantage on the borders, if they are driven back there.

After the Pétain Marshal recalled what precedes, the debate becomes animated, particularly between the President of the Republic and the Minister for the War, around the form of work which this defensive organization must cover.

But after several minutes of discussion, the Foch Marshal, who did not deliver his opinion yet, speaks then. Its remark is shingling:

To ensure the inviolability of the national territory! A new dogma there is posed… Up to now the defense of the territory was ensured by the operation of the armies. Today one wants to ensure [either defense but] the inviolability of the territory… one speaks to organize trenches [in times of peace]… The inviolability of the territory is not the goal paramount to assign with the armies. It is a perilous dogma; if one imposes it like first duty on the armies, they will be able to succumb to it.

On this, the Joffre Marshal approves:

It would be to dedicate itself to the defeat to want to establish a new wall of China!

And the Guillaumat General precise:

It would be dangerous to release in the public the idea of the inviolability of the territory… I believe that it should initially be wondered whether the Armies still need to be helped by the permanent fortification.

This stage of the discussion the policies note the reserve, even the opposition of the soldiers [with Pétain share] to this idea of inviolability. Also the President of the Republic reformulates it the initial question in terms which can only be consensual:

Does the Superior council of the War consider it convenient to approach the study of the defensive organization of the national territory?

Who would answer not? He thus collects the unanimous opinion and favorable participants!

Pétain marshal: it carries out the debates of the CSG more as a chief who imposes that as a person in charge who proposes.

Fortifications?

The continuation of the debates, even more surging, becomes almost stormy because the Pétain Marshal puts the question of the nature of work to realize. Obviously he already chose a precise solution since as a conclusion he adds, not with conditional but with the future:

There will be permanent fortification where we will be held on the defensive [and] on the other points there will be fortification of countryside or simple equipment of the face.

This assertion more political than military makes leap the Joffre Marshal who cannot admit that the system of fortification depends only on the Plan of operation because, recalls it, the Plan can change with the situation. Rétorque Pétain although in the actual position of the things one can almost indicate in advance the points on which armies will be on the defensive, like that of Longwy for example, but the Joffre Marshal in démord not:

In this moment, the Belgians are our allies, Switzerland is neutral, but one should not any less envisage all the possibilities… One cannot admit that the strengthened system is function of the Plan of operation [current. And to quote Séré de Rivières whose strengthened system answered the various probable assumptions well that it could not be concluded its, for lack of appropriations.]

The Pétain Marshal can only yield to these arguments, just like the President of the Republic which then requires the opinion of the Council on the need or not for completing work of permanent fortification.

Andre Maginot: a minister exceeded here by the terminology, or politically reserved?

Which fortification?

To answer the question, about the need or not for completing work of fortification [permanent] it is important to agree on what is a fortification. Also the debate which seemed to be calmed is again animated, particularly on the distinction between permanent fortification and fortification of countryside. And the part played around the politicians, who seem exceeded by the terminology, can be interpreted as follows:

The President of the Republic:

Fortification of countryside?

The Hellot General:

At the end of the war, the face presented many places where defense left something to be desired… With the mobilization we cannot hope to do in a few weeks what we could not do in 4 years [war]

The President of the Republic:

According to the Hellot General, it seems that it is necessary to make in time peace of the fortification of countryside!

The Debeney General:

One cannot count, to support the defense of the territory, on organizations made at the last time; we thus need permanent fortification!

The President of the Republic:

Does one owe as of time peace to undertake work of fortification of countryside at the same time as of work of permanent fortification?

The Pétain Marshal:

Any fortification of the time of peace can be regarded as permanent fortification.

The Buat General is not of this opinion:

The permanent fortification is characterized by the fact that it employs special materials, concrete, armourings…

The Pétain Marshal:

Perhaps it is necessary to change the old terminology!

The Guillaumat General approves:

Permanent fortification does not want to say exclusively strong concreted or armoured!

The President of the Republic in cost to its question:

Does one have to start as of the time of peace of work of fortification of countryside… and of work of permanent fortification?

The Guillaumat General:

The distinction is not clear between the fortification of countryside and the permanent fortification.

The President of the Republic:

Sometimes on the face I saw permanent fortification, as in Verdun, sometimes of the fortification of countryside, on the remainder of the face.

The Buat General:

Apart from Verdun, there can be bodies of permanent fortification: casemates, PC, observatories out of concrete.

The Debeney General is not agreement with his counterpart:

The permanent fortification applies to an organization overall, time of peace, likely to resist by itself… Fortified town, fortified camp, strengthened area… The difficulty of the problem arising comes from what we do not know the current type of the permanent fortification.

Since step badly of minutes the Minister for the War seems to be put except play by the specialists who discuss and, become simple spectator, it does not go more so far as to emit any opinion. Only the President of the Republic tries to reformulate his question regularly, but in vain since he pronounces the fateful words of permanent or of countryside! Also, in fine policy, it by modifying finishes the terms of its question:

Does the defensive organization of the time of peace have to comprise work of fortification?

The debate is then centred. But like the Marshals Joffre and Pétain exchange again, and lengthily, their divergent points of view on the question of continuous line or not along the border, the Foch Marshal cross short estimating that:

The discussion can lead to nothing because it is agitated in the abstract. [Then he adds] At the beginning of the meeting we affirmed the interest that there is to study the defensive organization of the territory. It thus should be studied. What will it be? Continuous face? … discontinuous face? Are the strengthened Areas out-of-date? Difficult to solve theoretically, dogmatically; it is necessary to examine the concrete case of the current border.

The Berthelot General divides this opinion; the Pétain Marshal proposes to entrust the study of the relative questions to the defensive organization of the territory at a Commission to create; this proposal is voted on by the President of the Republic; it is adopted and the meeting is raised.

In the paperboards of the CSG, the CDT (Commission of Defense of the Territory) comes to be conceived and, according to any probability, a new fortification is profiled at the horizon!

Reports

Two main issues will mine the army of the Thirties

This meeting of the CSG, of May 22, 1922, makes it possible to make the following reports:

Inviolability of the national territory

It is a primarily political and demagogic concept. The shortly after the Great War, the public opinion, tired of the massacres, can only be attracted by this way which privileges the defensive; the policies are engulfed there.

For the majority of the soldiers, this inviolability passes badly because it leads to immobilize and sclerose the armies whereas the wars are gained only by the innovation and the movement.

As for the Pétain Marshal, it is all the more favorable to the concept of inviolability that it sees a means there of associating necessarily powerful defense and movement. Indeed, in 1916 it personally held Verdun in defensive. And it did not do it for lack of ardour military but while waiting to have a sufficiently strong army to be effective in the offensive.

One of the problems, which will divide the men, the policies and soldiers of the Thirties, is precisely that of the royal share made with the defensive, with the detriment of the offensive.

Fortifications

The fortifications are very expensive. And even if mobile weaponry is also expensive, this last with the advantage of being able to be transported where the need is felt some, contrary to the fortification whose expenditure often seems to be done to no purpose.

It is thus important to strengthen only advisedly. And one is in front of a second problem which will divide to him also the men (and particularly the army) of the Thirties: where to strengthen? How to strengthen?

This problem of fortification, permanent or of countryside, which is that makes more the debate during this meeting of the CSG. It will not cease poisoning the relations between the weapon of the Genius and the various chiefs of Staffs. So much so that, as of the dissolution of the CORF (organization which will plan and homogenize the design and the construction of the Maginot Line), since 1935, the fortification become decentralized will sink towards aberrant and hysterical frenzy of heterogeneous constructions, without much value of defense and with the detriment of the means of attack.

Notices [except fortifications] on decentralizations?

For which national cause that it is, why decentralization in 2007 would give it better results that in 1935?

Terminology

Fortification of countryside and permanent fortification

As in all the specialized fields, each definition can be declined ad infinitum or reduced with its strict minimum. That of the fortification does not escape the rule. Without going to seek very far in time, if one refers during fortification of the captain of the Genious Bailly (1875) one notes that it defines 3 types of fortification: the permanent one, the momentary one and the provisional one (called also mixed or half-permanent). It does not give an explicit a report on the fortification of countryside.

Without wanting to play the specialists we will schematize the problem to clarify it, more especially as the contents of the definitions had a considerable incidence on construction, and especially the evolution, of the Maginot Line.

Fortifications, according to the captain of the Bailly Genious

Permanent fortification

The permanent fortification has the aim of reinforcing military positions of a permanent interest, by means of solid works, built in advance in times of peace, and carefully maintained in good state.

Momentary fortification

The momentary fortification has the aim of reinforcing military positions of a momentary interest, by means of works built at the time of the need, during time often extremely short and with the very weak resources often one has.

Provisional fortification (mixes or half-permanent)

The provisional fortification has the aim of reinforcing military positions of a provisional interest, by means of works built throughout war, in preparation for future events, and using resources relatively more considerable than those which one has in the momentary fortification.

Discussion

In a diagrammatic way, according to the Bailly captain, one can say that the fortification is momentary or provisional when it is built in time of war (it is what during the CSG of May 2, 1922, one names fortification of countryside) and which it is permanent when it is built in times of peace (and supposed the being with large means).

And if, in times of peace, one makes fortification with very limited resources, how calls it one? And if, as in Verdun in 1916, one makes fortification with large means? And if…

Like says it the Marshal Pétain, on May 2, 1922: perhaps should one change the definitions!

Terminology according to the armament, according to the Lt-colonel of the Truttmann Genious

In its book entitled: The Wall of France, Lt-colonel Philippe Truttmann gives us a key of interpretation of the new terminology:

During the Great War, the appearance of prefabricated materials (curved sheets, shields, stakes, artificial brambles, etc) and processes of fast concreting caused hitherto a41dernier $c-b1, e,10 $c-b26 ce $c-b16 $c-b43, bn,84 to bring closer these concepts paradoxical [permanent fortification: powerful; fortification of countryside: rapid and light]. The war of position of the years 1916-1917 has, under the influence of the evolution of the technical processes, makes emerge a kind of compromise solution: the fortification of reinforced countryside, or into hard.

This new phenomenon did not fail to allure many big bosses resulting from the war: this quickly built fortification, thanks to the abundance of mobilized labour, appears adapted better to realities since a permanent fortification established a priori, according to assumptions which can not be checked, and whose appropriations of construction are to be required of the Parliament, always raising storms.

In addition, the increasing complexity of the permanent works requires more and more a particular armament - unemployed elsewhere and garrisons of specialists. On the other hand the fortification of countryside, even if its output is not the same one, can be occupied or evacuated at will by standardized units, with their armament of equipment.

Simplified diagram of the negative evolution of the Maginot Line.

Conclusion

In 1927, the controversy between permanent, expensive but powerful fortification, and fortification of countryside, easy to implement at low costs [but often of poor yield], takes temporarily fine. The politicians slice. One will build a permanent fortification in three precise areas (3 strengthened areas: Metz, Lauter, Belfort) and, in addition, one will set up a fortification of countryside, through which the army will operate.

The project of the future Maginot Line is thus stopped.

But it was without taking into account holding of the fortification only of countryside which will return to the load regularly, inter alia with each budgetary reduction and each delay of construction. So that as from 1935, gaining the part, the latter will direct the Maginot Line towards the “whole countryside”, making it rock towards a fortification camelote (like Lt-colonel Philippe Truttmann writes it).

The acute fever bétonite seized France then where one built, instead of a mobile armament, heterogeneous hundreds of blockhouse whose often only appearance gave the illusion of the power of the initial productions of the Maginot Line.

Photograph of the one of the two entries of the Outpost of Pierre-Pointed. The entry is of face, framed by two huts of the external quartering, used in the absence of attack.